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FAILURE OF AN EXCAVATION SUPPORT SYSTEM
S.J. Boone J. Westland
Golder Associates Ltd. Golder Associates Ltd.
2390 Argentia Rd. 2390 Argentia Rd.
Mississauga, ON L5N5Z7, Canada Mississauga, ON L5N5Z7, Canada
ABSTRACT
The design, construction, and collapse of an excavation support system constructed through layered soils are presented in this paper. The
braced soldier-pile and lagging shoring was installed through soft clay, with the base of the excavation in hard glacial deposits.
Complicating factors included the use of soil berms for temporary support, construction sequencing, weather conditions, and the location
of the failed section near a re-entrant corner of the shoring system. Rapid responses of all contract parties and careful evaluation of the
failure causes limited subsequent safety and damage concerns, and no claims were made. Post-failure examination of the preceding events
provides several insights into potential better specification practices. Theoretical comparison of soil strength and structural engineering
principles demonstrate the true failure mechanisms in spite of several implied causes suggested at the outset of the investigation.
INTRODUCTION
The design, construction, and subsequent collapse of an
excavation support system are presented in this paper. During
excavation for a subway station, a large section of shoring
collapsed. The braced soldier-pile and lagging shoring was
installed through soft, varved clay, with the base of the
excavation in hard and dense glacial deposits. Complicating
factors included the use of soil berms for temporary support,
construction sequencing, weather conditions, and the location of
the failed section near a re-entrant corner of the shoring system.
Due to the particular location and time of the failure, no
personnel were injured and damage to other facilities was
limited, though conditions were such that immediate actions
were required in some other shored areas. Post-failure
examination of the events leading to the failure provides several
insights into better specification practices. Theoretical
comparison of soil strength and structural engineering principles
demonstrates the true failure mechanisms in spite of several
implied causes suggested at the outset of the failure
investigation.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Construction of a new subway station required an 11 m deep,
shored excavation through a thin layer of fill, varved silt and
clay of variable strength (see Figure 1), and a hard cohesive
glacial till underlying the soft deposits. Undrained shear strength
of the hard glacial till deposit was about 300 kPa or greater.
The contract for the subway station was developed as a design-
bid-build contract. A performance specification governed the
design of the shoring system; minimum design and construction
requirements were to be met, but the detailed shoring design
was to be completed by the contractor. A subcontractor
completed shoring construction and a separate firm retained by
the shoring subcontractor completed the shoring design.
Excavation was carried out by a separate organization
subcontracted to the general contractor.
GENERAL SHORING DESIGN
The soldier pile and lagging shoring system consisted of steel
wide-flange beams placed in pre-drilled holes with the annular
space around the beams filled with a sand-cement mix
(unconfined compression strength ≈ 0.4 MPa). The collapse
occurred at a corner of the shoring where the station excavation
changed in width. The planned shoring design is illustrated in
Figures 2 and 3.  In this area, the horizontal restraint for the
narrow section was to be provided by pipe struts running north
to south where resistance could be provided by the opposing
side of the excavation. In the wider station area, support was to
be provided by both corner braces and tiebacks. Existing
utilities diagonally crossing the excavation were relocated so
they paralleled the shoring line.
SEQUENCE OF SHORING CONSTRUCTION
After relocation of the utilities and installation of the piles, the
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excavation was taken down to the level of the first tieback row,
about 2 m below the top of the piles, and the tie-backs were
installed. After about a month and a half, excavation was
resumed and taken to the level of the second row of tiebacks
and the tiebacks were installed, but not connected to the shoring
or stressed. A labor strike took place, delaying further
construction for about three weeks. Following the strike, the
work resumed as follows:
Day 1. Excavation resumed at Structure Unit 79 near the
southwest corner, and only the excavation subcontractor was
working.
Day 2. Excavation and lagging continued between piles S81 and
S92 for Structure Unit 81. A ramp for excavation equipment
was prepared on the north side of the excavation, directly
opposite piles S87 to S90. Sewer backfill and native soil
collapsed through lagging between piles S80 and S81 at 5.5 m
below the ground surface north of the manhole.
Day 3. The center and north side of Structure Unit 79 was
excavated. Lagging was installed between piles S73 to S109.
Wales were installed between piles S82 and S87.
Day 4. The entrance gate for earthmoving equipment was
relocated to the north side ramp location. Excavation continued
and lagging was installed between S97 to S107.
Day 5. A wale was installed between piles S80 and S82 and
excavation and lagging continued between piles S97 and S101.
Day 9. Following the weekend and holiday, excavation was
resumed. The lower tie-backs were stressed from pile S76 to
S82, inclusive. Earth berms were left in place to support the
retaining structure prior to placement of struts, as illustrated in
Figure 4. This practice is typical of local construction, and is a
practice used elsewhere (e.g. Clough and Denby, 1977).
Day 10. Excavation continued on the north side of Unit 79 and
88 and lagged between piles S71 to S83 and N73 to N81 (not
shown in Figure 2). Figure 4 illustrates the conditions on Day
10 prior to failure.
Day 11. Excavation continued on north side of Structure Unit
79, but no lagging or welding occurred due to rain.
Day 12. No work due to rain.
Day 15. After heavy rain over the weekend, excavation
continued in center of Structure Unit 79. Struts were installed
across the excavation at piles S91 to S96. Lagging and
excavation continued between piles S71 and S81 and was
finished to subgrade, leaving one lift of lagging to be completed
from piles S83 to S87.
Day 16. The shoring collapsed in the early morning hours prior
to crews arriving on site. Figure 4 illustrates the conditions
immediately prior to the collapse and Figure 5 illustrates
conditions on the morning the collapse was discovered.
WHAT WENT WRONG?
Immediately following the collapse various parties suggested
several possible causes. The suggested causes included:
• heavy rainfall contributing to additional loads (filling of the
sewer trench backfill);
• deep-seated failure of the ground beneath the shoring
occurred because of higher pore water pressures and low
strength; and
• a lack of structural or earth support.
A detailed evaluation of all of these potential causes was
undertaken to ascertain the possible failure mechanisms. It was
considered necessary to evaluate the failure to determine what





































Vane Shear Tests (1965 - 1967)
Vane Shear Tests (1993 - 1995)





Triaxial Compression Tests (1967)
Figure 1. Subsurface conditions in area of shoring
collapse.
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failure to avoid similar situations occurring elsewhere on the
project. Where possible, the most unambiguous analysis
methods and averaged soil properties were used to provide as
much of an unbiased conclusion as possible.
To understand what went wrong, the simplest of these causes
was examined first, namely, the possible lack of structural or
earth support.
Loads and Resistance
The failure of the shoring system involved complex three-
dimensional loading and three-dimensional variations in the
load resistance characteristics of the support system
components. Therefore, the loads and resistances were resolved
into orthogonal components in the north-south (NS) and east-
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Figure 2. Shoring design in area of 
corner failure. Locations of soldier 
piles are noted as S81, S82, etc. 
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The NS load component in this case has to be resisted ultimately
by the struts placed against pile S87 and the bending resistance
of the piles S82 through S87. Prior to the failure, the
contractor’s personnel and advisors considered that the
northward loads would be resisted by earth berms left in place
in front of piles S87 to S90.
The conditions and geometry of the failed earth mass behind the
shoring were generally consistent with an active failure of the
earth mass behind the wall with subsequent progressive failure
of the unsupported soils. The maximum distance from the wall
to the failure scarp was approximately 1 to 1.5 times the
maximum vertical height between the glacial till layer and the
ground surface elevation. The scarp formed a circular patter
with a radius originating near the location of the corner pile
(S87). All of the piles destroyed by the failure also appeared to
be bent in the direction of failure near the interface of the glacial
till and glaciolacustrine soils.
Undrained soil parameters were used in the analysis for the
cohesive soils because of the relatively short duration of
excavation and subsequent failure. A plot of the undrained shear
strength measurements through the clay deposit is illustrated in
Figure 1. For granular soils, such as those placed in the
replacement sewer trench and as backfill in the old sewer
trench, typical effective-stress frictional properties were used in
the calculations.
Because the piles were loaded in cantilever bending, i.e. there
were no struts in place, and deformations were not restricted,
active and passive earth pressures were assumed to act on the
shoring system. Active earth pressures were determined using
the commonly-used equations of Bell (1915) for a cohesive soil
(no frictional component) and a zone exhibiting zero active
earth pressure in the upper part of the wall (though the tension
component of this load was ignored). This approach produced
the minimum active load on the wall. The presence of the sewer
trench and backfill (partially saturated or fully saturated) was
also evaluated using conventional earth pressure methods where
the trench was considered equivalent to a partially water-filled
or fully water-filled tension crack (e.g. Bowles 1996). The
passive earth loads and resistances were determined using trial
wedge methods (e.g NAVFAC 1986, Kezdi 1979), particularly
because of the downward back-slope geometry of the berm. The
soil load or resistance on any one pile was taken as the pressure
or unit load multiplied by the total horizontal distance halfway
to the piles on either side in the appropriate analysis direction.
These approaches were adopted for their simplicity of
calculating acting and resisting forces and their resultants using
unambiguous and well-know formulae. At the time this work
Earth load from 
PART width or 
height of wall per 
pile
Earth load from 
FULL width or 
height of wall per 
pile
Reaction force of 






























Figure 3. Earth loads and support mechanisms for shoring corner had all structural members been in place.
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was completed, there was insufficient time for extensive
numerical modeling of this problem.
From the available evidence, it was clear that the piles were
loaded in a cantilever mode. Cantilever “beams” composed of
wide-flange steel sections are inherently unstable unless
adequate support is provided to the flange loaded in
compression (in this case, the exposed face of the piles). Wide-
flange steel sections are unstable under cantilever loading
conditions because their resistance to bending in one direction
(the strong or X axis) is far greater than in the perpendicular
direction (the weak or Y axis direction). Lateral bracing of the
compression flange of shoring piles is generally achieved with:
1) nominal passive resistance provided by the lagging, although
the lagging is not directly connected to the piles; and 2) the
strength of the soil (and filler material for pre-drilled piles) that
surrounds the pile.  The degree of lateral bracing of the piles
involved in the shoring collapse was questionable because the
steel support in the plane of the shoring face varied in location
and connection detail. It was considered that the lagging would
not give any lateral support to the piles once failure began since
as the piles deflected, the lagging would likely cease to be in
contact with the steel and would be free to fall away from the
shoring. Therefore, the ultimate bending resistance of the piles
was calculated according to the methods outlined by Johnston
(1976) and CISC (1993) and was calculated for unbraced
lengths (L) ranging between 0 and 10 m.  It was considered that
beam tables and code-based formulae were insufficient for
evaluation of ultimate structural capacity in unbraced bending in
both strong and weak axes as lateral-torsional buckling could
readily dominate the failure mode. The formula for the ultimate
or critical stress induced by lateral-torsional buckling for a
cantilever beam is (Johnston, 1970):
σc = C1π(EIyGJ) 1 +  π2ECw 1/2 (1)
  Sx(KL)       GJ(KL)2 
where the elastic and shear moduli (E and G), torsion/warping
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Figure 5. Photograph of collapse looking south.
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modulus (I and S) are found in steel design manuals (e.g. CISC
1993). The constant K, for a fully laterally unsupported
cantilever beam with one end fixed in both axis directions, is set
equal to one. The constant C1 ranges from 1.3 for a concentrated
load to 2.05 for a uniform load. For this project, it was
considered that the loading would be closer to uniform than a
concentrated point load, and this constant was therefore set
equal to 2.05 to result in the maximum calculated resistance.
Analysis Cases
It was clear that all of the structural support designed for the
shoring system was not in place at the time of failure. Key
components of the support that were missing included the steel
straps along the north face (piles S87 to S91) and the struts
against piles S87 through S90. As noted, it was believed by the
contractor and shoring designer that the earth berm would
provide sufficient temporary support. For the conditions
immediately prior to failure, three separate analysis cases (see
Figure 6) were examined to determine which of the possible
load and resistance modes may have triggered the failure.
Case A: Construction up until the time of failure had not
included installation of the steel straps along the north face,
between piles S87 and S91, as indicated in Figure 2 and 4. In
this case, there was no support to pile S87 in the east-west
direction except for the pile’s own bending resistance.
Case B: The absence of struts placed against pile S87 at the time
of the failure meant that only the cumulative bending resistance
of the piles was available to resist the northward component of
the loading on piles S83 to S87.
Case C: North-south loading was also examined for pile S88 as
representative of piles S88 through S90 that also failed. Load
resistance for these piles was to be provided by the two levels of
struts that spanned the excavation to the north side. Because the
struts were not in place for these piles, the load resistance was
provided by the earth berm and bending resistance of the piles.
Analysis Results
Figure 6 illustrates the loading conditions on the piles for Cases
A, B, and C.  The point on the “unbraced length of pile” axis,
below the intersection of the lines plotted for structural bending
resistance and the lines plotted for soil loading indicates the
point at which pile collapse could be expected to occur (critical
point).  In assessing the results of the analyses, the lateral
bracing conditions were considered to be between the two
extremes of unbraced length where partial bracing was present,
e.g. pile S87 where the internal wales are present on the south
side but no support is provided on the north (see Figure 7). As
illustrated in this figure the calculated critical point for Load
Case A occurs at an unbraced length less than the possible field
conditions. The difference between the calculated critical point
and the smallest of the possible unbraced lengths for Case A is
greater than that of either Cases B or C.  The results clearly
indicated that collapse of the piles due to static loading would be
likely for both load Case A and B, with Case A being the most
critical. There is greater uncertainty with respect to soil strength
and earth pressure loading than for the structural conditions at
failure, particularly considering the effects of time. It is
therefore considered that the actual active earth pressure acting
on the wall at the time of failure was slightly less than or the
passive earth resistance slightly more than assumed in the
structural analysis (see Figure 7).
Based on the observed conditions immediately after failure and
subsequent analyses, it was concluded that the principal
engineering causes of the failure were, listed in order of
importance:
1. plate steel straps were not in place along the north wall face
between piles S87 to S89;
2. struts were not in place to support piles S87 to S90 for the
convenience of the north-side excavation ramp;
3. excavation and lagging was rapidly completed to within 2
m of the subgrade elevation all along the west wall; and
4. the center of the excavation was taken to approximately 1
m above the final subgrade elevation leaving only earth
berms to support the piles on the south side of the
excavation.
It was considered most likely that, because of the rapid
excavation along the west wall, inadequate support was
provided to pile S87 in its weak-axis direction and this pile
became overloaded. Without the presence of the steel straps
along the northern face, the bending resistance of the single pile
in its weak direction was insufficient. Failure of this pile,
triggered further instability of the piles along the west wall,
leading to collapse of the southwestern section where the wall
was not restrained by tiebacks. Simultaneously, the collapse of








Figure 6. Analysis cases.
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the remaining berm on the north side between piles S87 and
S88. Successive west to east loss of ground forming the berm
and any nominal lateral bracing provided by the lagging, as each
subsequent pile eastward collapsed, is likely to have resulted in
the progressive failure of the shoring system. Failure stopped
where pile S91 was restrained by a strut and S82 was restrained
by a tieback.
On Figure 7, the influence of rainfall saturating the sewer trench
backfill is also illustrated. It can be seen that the potential filling
the trench with water likely had little if any effect on the overall
stability of the shoring and ground system.
Analyses were also conducted to examine the potential for deep,
rotational stability to satisfy the concern that failure near or
below the level of the pile toes precipitated the shoring collapse.
These analyses indicated that the overall ground mass would
have exhibited a factor of safety of much greater than 3 had the
wall remained intact.
CONCLUSIONS
Theoretical formulae for the calculation of ultimate lateral-
torsional buckling, active earth pressures, and passive resistance
agreed well with the conditions preceding the failure. Although
there was some unknown influence of the actual distribution of
stresses, the actual unbraced pile lengths, the coefficients chosen
for structural calculations, and the simplified resolution of loads
into two directions, the analytical results also indicated a
reasonable mechanism for overall failure of the support system.
The failure of an engineered system is seldom due to one critical
mistake. During the days immediately preceding the collapse,
several factors combined to lead to the failure including:
• the strike led to impatience and accelerated construction;
• the weather inhibited work of the shoring subcontractor’s
crews and created more impatience;
• the excavation subcontractor was not under the direct
UNBRACED LENGTH OF PILE (m)
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Figure 6. Comparison of cumulative ultimate lateral-torsional pile bending moment capacity to moments induced
from soil loads.
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control of the shoring subcontractor;
• aggressive excavation and disagreements related to the
equipment access ramp confused construction in the
immediate area;
• other activities demanded the attention of the shoring
foreman and on-site geotechnical representative; and
• one of the monitoring points in the immediate area of the
collapse had been mislabeled and was thought to be in an
area already fully supported (see Figure 8) and, according
to design expectations, the measurements had not reached a
previously determined critical level until one reading was
taken late in the day immediately preceding the failure.
These issues contributed to the lack of attention to detail
regarding installation of the steel straps and maintaining earth
support in critical areas. In future contracts, it would be
beneficial to require that the excavation crews be under the
direct supervision of the shoring foreman.
Considering the activities preceding the failure, it was
exceptionally fortuitous that no one was seriously injured as the
result of the failure. It must also be recognized that, although
many factors contributed to the failure, all of the contractors and
subcontractors worked rapidly and without self-interest in order
to repair the failure and resume work. Exceptional cooperation
among all on-site personnel resulted in a project that, in spite of
the shoring failure, became a success for all involved. Rapid
responses of all contract parties and careful evaluation of the
failure causes limited subsequent safety concerns and damages,
and no claims were made.
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Figure 8. Settlement monitoring data for mislabeled survey point located 3 m east of S84, previously
presumed to have been at the position of another point located between S81 and S80 (labels were
mistakenly switched in the field).
